The de nitions of cooperation to shared plans and joint intentionality have traditionally included subsidiary goals: they aim at coordinating the part of the group's action which goes beyond the control of individual intentionality. In this paper, we present a de nition of collective acting which explains goals aiming at the group's coordination as a result of the interaction of goal adoption, group utility and recursive modeling of BDI agents.
Introduction
What is involved when a group of agents decides to do something together? Cohen and Levesque 1 answered to this question that if the group's members were directed by single agent intentions towards a shared plan, they would risk to let the group act in an irrational way; in fact, a member could realize that her task is impossible to achieve or that the shared goal has been satis ed: she would leave the group, while the remaining members could go on in trying to pursue an impossible or already achieved goal. For this reason, Cohen and Levesque 1 add to the de nition of joint intention some subsidiary goals which must be satis ed just in case an agent believes that the joint intention has been satis ed, etc.: in all these cases, she should drop her main intention, but pursue the goal of making the remaining agents aware of the new situation.
We present an operational de nition of joint intentionality based on the idea that subsidiary goals, which come into play at the end of the group activity, can be explained as a consequence of the interplay of three factors: the group's utility, goal adoption and anticipatory coordination.
First of all, the rationality of the group's action is de ned in terms of the bene t of the entire group and not only of the advantage of the single members. If the group's members followed only their individual intentions, they would achieve a better individual performance, since they would stop their action when it becomes just a waste of time and resources; but, in this way, they would leave the remaining agent working without any real achievement, thus reducing the group's overall performance.
Second, making the remaining agents aware that some new situations hold, as prescribed by the de nition of joint intention, is an instance of a more general behavior which Conte and Castelfranchi 2 call goal adoption. The goal of making the partners believe that the joint goal has been achieved or is impossible to achieve can be motivated by a similar attitude of agents: the agent is adopting a control goal of the partners, i.e., a goal which stems during the intentional execution of an action. Goal adoption, per se, does not imply doing anything for another agent's goals. An adopted goal is given as input for means-ends reasoning, but it still must undergo the deliberation process of the agent. It is selected as the actual intention only if the agent gains from its satisfaction the maximum advantage with respect to the other alternatives. We measure the advantage an agent gains in terms of the decision theoretic concept of utility. In case of collective action -as stated above -the utility that must be considered is a combination of the private utility of an agent with that of her partners in the shared plan.
Finally, if agents interact (in a cooperative or con ictual way) in a resource bounded environment, when they have to measure the utility of their actions, they cannot but take into account the e ect of their actions on the other agents. In particular, they have to compute the utility not of the outcome of their actions, but the utility of the outcomes produced by the predicted reactions of their interactants. In case of cooperation among agents, this means that an action must be chosen only after the agent has predicted what her partners can (or cannot) do afterwards and she has computed which is the utility of the resulting situations for the entire group (anticipatory coordination, another brick of social rationality, according to Conte and Castelfranchi 2 ).
The De nition of Cooperation and the Planning Algorithm
We assume that an agent has a set of preferences and goals and that she does planning in order to nd a (possibly partial) plan which satis es one or more of these goals and maximizes the agent's utility. The chosen plan constitutes the current (individual) intention of the agent. Then, the plan is executed in a reactive manner, i.e., monitoring e ects and triggering replanning in case of failure or new information.
Since a decision must be taken about which plan to choose, we need some techniques to balance the di erent possibilities: we adopted the decision theoretic planner DRIPS described in Haddawy and Hanks 3 , where they described a way to relate the notions of goals and planning to that of utility.
In our de nition of cooperation, a group GR composed of agents G 1 , .. ., G n cooperates to a shared plan x for achieving goal ' (with an associated recipe R x composed of steps x;k1 1 , . .. , x;kq m ), when:
1. each step x;k l has been assigned to an agent G k in GR for its execution; 2. each agent G k of the group GR has the single agent intention to perform his part x;k l , an intention relative (in Cohen and Levesque 4 's sense) to the existence of the group shared plan; 3. all the agents of GR have the mutual belief that each one (G k ) is engaged in cooperating to ' with GR by means of recipe R x ; 4. all the agents mutually know that they share an utility function f GR based on a weighed sum of the utility of the goal ', which the shared plan aims at, and of the resource consumption of the single agents; 5. when an agent G k becomes aware that a partner G j has a goal that stems from his intention to do his part x;j p , G k will consider whether to adopt it; 6. each agent G k remains in the group so long as the group's expected utility of going on in performing x;k m for ' or adopting some of the goals of the partners is greater than the expected utility of doing nothing more for the group. For what concerns point 5, the goals that are adopted by an agent G k are the subgoals which G j has formed while planning how to perform his part and while executing them in a reactive way. Therefore, G k considers not only the steps of x;b p she may execute to assist G j in performing his task, but also G j 's goals deriving from his single agent intention to perform x;j p : knowing how to perform x;j p , achieving its preconditions, monitoring the execution. The above de nition is not by itself su cient, since it does not explicitly address the problem of anticipatory coordination. In order to implement it, we had to revise the evaluation of the heuristics for action selection of the DRIPS planner: before the evaluation of an action outcome is carried out, the outcome of G A is updated with the e ects of the partner G B 's reaction which the agent tries to predict via a recursive modeling of the planning and decision making activity of her partner about his part of the shared plan (see Boella 5 for the details).
Second G b 's beliefs must be constructed from the outcomes of each G a 's alternative R yi . In many situations, in fact, G b is not aware of all the e ects of G a 's action. In this proposal, a STRIPS-like solution to this subjective form of the frame problem is adopted; G b 's knowledge of a state is updated by an action of G a only with the e ects which are explicitly mentioned as believed by G b in the action de nition. a Since not all states are distinguishable from G b 's point of view, we exploit the game-theoretic notion of information set. (1 l v) , the group's utility function f GR is applied to these sets of (probability, state) pairs, and the plan R besti;j which maximizes the following formula is the one selected by agent G b for execution in S b i;j (its outcome is S b i;j;besti;j = f(p 3 Cooperation phenomena explained Helpful behavior: helpful behavior (i.e., goal adoption) is provided not only when the group cannot otherwise proceed in its plan, but, also, it should not be provided indiscriminately. By exploiting the decision theoretic paradigm, it is possible to keep apart the forms of help that are rational from those that appear to be just a waste of resources. If the e ort for satisfying adopted goals con icts with the ability of the agent to do her own part, then, a decrease in the group utility is obtained, instead of an increase.
Communication: As a special case of goal-adoption, it is possible to predict various forms of communication: they arise when the goal to be adopted is a control goal; that is, a goal of G b to know some information, like the truth value of constraints and preconditions of actions, and whether an action succeeded boella: submitted to World Scienti c on June 19, 2001 or not. The e ect of a communicative action is to make such a goal true (at least with some probability). Communication does not always worth its cost for the group. The agent G a has to consider the cost of communicating with G b . If communication is expensive, slow or unreliable, then it is not convenient for the group to waste resources in kindly communicating, since G b could discover the desired information in a less expensive manner.
Hierarchical groups: the consumption of resources need not be weighed in a uniform way for all members of the group; a sort of hierarchy in the group can be induced by weighing -in the multi-attribute utility function -resource consumption di erently depending on the agent who executes an action.
Con ict avoidance: since agents share a group utility function and perform anticipatory coordination, they will (try to) avoid con icts with other agents' intentions: performing an action that interferes with the plans of other team members decreases the utility of the whole team. When G a considers the possible developments of her partial plan, she examines what e ects her action will have on the partners' plans. So also the possible interferences are weighed as any other cost that decreases the group utility: con icts result in less preferred choices, but they are not necessarily ruled out.
Ending cooperation: when all members know that the top-level goal of the group has been achieved, has become impossible or irrelevant, then no more utility can be obtained by any other actions than terminating the group: in fact, termination gets higher utility by saving resources. Therefore, the shared plan is naturally ruled out, without the need of stipulating other explicit conditions for its termination.
